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The Endangered Species
Act and the Ecosystem
of Columbia River
Salmon
by John M. Volkman'
I. Introduction
Microsoft's Encarta encyclopedia, an on-line reference
tool. says that salmon canneries are a big industry on the
Pacific coast. It is true that salmon canneries were a major
employer on the Pacific coast of the United States 30 years
ago: some were still there 20 years ago. But salmon up and
down the Pacific coast are in decline; Columbia River
salmon have been in decline for decades. There has not
been a harvest targeted on Columbia River spring chinook
salmon for more than 20 years and for summer chinook, it
has been longer. Snake River coho salmon officially became
extinct in 1987 Currently. you can count on one hand the
number of sockeye salmon returning to Idaho. In the last
four years. while Snake River salmon have been on the
Endangered Species list. the declines have continued and
many wild salmon subpopulations are at the edge of obliv-
ion. In most coastal communities, salmon canneries are a
thing of the past. Someone should alert Bill Gates.
If we placed preeminent value on recovering salmon
populations. there would be no secret about how to do it: we
would restore the salmon ecosystem. But there is also no
secret about why this hasn't happened. What was once a
salmon ecosystem is now the habitat of millions of human
beings who carry on their activities in and around the
Columbia River system. The system is sprawling, composed
of many watersheds in four states and two nations; count-
less tributaries; a mainstem river 1.200 miles long; a large
estuary; and a big swath of the Pacific Ocean. Human devel-
opment has broken up the salmon ecosystem into dispersed
fragments which, if salmon are going to thrive, need to be
rehabilitated and reconnected.' This presents the Northwest
with a series of difficult questions: Can the salmon ecosys-
tem be restored without seriously undermining the human
activities that degrade it? If human activity must be sacn-
ficed to ecosystem recovery, can ecosystem recovery hap-
pen? If ecosystem recovery is unrealistic, what does this
bode for the sustainability of the ecological systems on
which much human activity depends? 2
General Counsel. Northwest Power Planning Council. Portland.
Oregon. From a speech to the University of Colorado Natural Resource
Center's conference on Biodiversity Protection. lune 9-12. 1996. The views
expressed in this artide are mine. not the Power Planning Council's. I am
grateful for the suggestions of my colleague iohn Shurts. Senior Counsel to
the Power Planning Councl
i. See INDEPENDEr ScElwnnc GRuP. RE uRn TO THE RivE. REsrOm ,ON oF
SAU,'ONID FiSHEs IN THE COLUMBIA RivER Ecosysisa. DEVELOFAEt.T AND SYvri-HEsis
OF SaENCE UNDERLYING THE CoLuwme RivER B.Asu FSH AND WILDUE PRoGRXM OF
THE NORnwST POWER PLANNING COUNcIL 22 (Sept iO. 1996) (hereinafter
RETURN TOHE RrvERI
2. A group of eminent scentists recently characterized a variation of
the dilemma this way. -it human activities are to be sustainable, we need to
ensure that the ecological systems on which our economies depend are
resilient The problem involved in devising environmental polices is to
ensure that resilience is maintained, even though the limits on the nature
and scale of economic activities thus required are necessarily uncertain:
Kenneth Arrow et al Economic Growth. Caning Capadty and the Environment.
268 SCERNCE 520. 521 (Apr 28. 19951
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For fifteen years, the Northwest has been trying
to restore Columbia River salmon with what by any
standard is an impressive collection of tools,
including the Endangered Species Act. Given the
fact that wild salmon continue to decline, it is fair to
ask how these tools are working. This paper reviews
the Endangered Species Act program on the
Columbia River and makes two points, which are
intended less as criticisms than as observations.
First, the Endangered Species Act process is geared
towards species recovery, which is different from
ecosystem recovery. As scientists continue to push
recovery programs toward ecosystem approaches,
we may see changes in the Endangered Species Act
program, but the changes have not yet happened.
Second, even if the Endangered Species Act process
took an ecosystem approach, it still would be faced
with major economic and political challenges. That
these challenges exist is not an argument against
the recovery effort. But the nature of these difficul-
ties, combined with other limitations of the
Endangered Species Act's tools, suggest that restor-
ing wild Columbia River salmon to self-sustaining
levels will require much more than the Endangered
Species Act itself can deliver.
II. Background
A. The Salmon Ecosystem, the Working River and
the Decline of Salmon
The ecosystem of Columbia River salmon is
bigger than the Columbia River. Salmon are born
inland: some are born in headwater tributaries far in
the interior parts of the region in high mountainous
areas. As they begin to grow, young salmon move
downstream, beginning a migration to the Pacific
Ocean. Once they leave the tributaries and enter the
main river, juvenile salmon must find their way past
a series of large dams. If they survive, they reach the
Columbia River estuary where they spend time feed-
ing and undergo a physiological conversion from
freshwater fish to saltwater fish. When the transi-
tion to saltwater is complete, they spend several
years in the Pacific Ocean growing to mature size,
which can be anywhere from about 10 to more than
100 pounds. After several years in the ocean, the
mature fish reenter the river. Once in the river, they
stop feeding and start a long and difficult migration
back to their spawning grounds, past dams and
thermal blockages, into the tributaries and up to
the place of their birth. There, if spawning gravels
have not been covered by silt eroded from the
neighboring watershed, the fish spawn and die.
Their progeny repeat the cycle. Historically, count-
less populations of salmon made similar trips from
headwaters of Canadian and American streams. It is
one of the great and mysterious natural cycles,
characteristic of a vibrant natural world.
Today, at almost each point in the salmon
migration, human activities impinge: mining and
logging in the headwaters; irrigation depletion and
agricultural runoff in the middle reaches of the
rivers; industrial and urban water pollution at sev-
eral points; an estuary that collects pollutants local-
ly and from upriver; an ocean environment that
varies with changes in global temperature; fishing
in the ocean and in the river; and at many places
along the way, dams.
Most of the life of a salmon is spent in the
ocean. More than any other factor, ocean conditions
explain year-to-year fluctuations in salmon popula-
tions. However, we do not know much about ocean
conditions, how they are changing, and how salmon
are affected. Because there is not much we can do
about the ocean, most of the attention in salmon
recovery is devoted to the inland ecosystem, espe-
cially rivers.
The Columbia River's tributaries absorb the
impacts of development activities in surrounding
watersheds: timber harvest, grazing, irrigation, min-
ing, urbanization and other development. In the
mainstem of the Columbia, dams slow the migra-
tion, heat up the river, subject fish to pressure
changes and descaling and affect food production
in the river. Dams have converted the river to some-
thing resembling a series of lakes, which are more
hospitable to salmon predators like squawfish than
they are to salmon. The dams have inundated what
was once productive streamside habitat. They have
simplified the river's complexity by eliminating
braided channels and hydrologic prozesses that
once were part of important food and energy chains.
The Columbia River hydropower dams provide
about a third of the Northwest's electric energy, the
largest interconnected hydropower system in the
world. It produces billions of dollars of revenues
every year, even after paying for other public pur-
poses such as irrigation assistance. Navigation
locks and calm reservoirs permit barge traffic as far
inland as Lewiston, Idaho, enabling farmers to ship
crops to international markets. When Portland
escaped inundation in the wet spring of 1996, the
Army Corps of Engineers estimated that without the
dams, parts of downtown Portland would have been
under seven feet of water.
In engineering the river, a great deal of natural
salmon productivity was lost. From historic peaks
ranging from 10 to 16 million adult fish, the
Columbia River salmon runs have declined to
approximately a million adult fish. As bleak as this
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number is, it understates the decline of the wild
salmon stocks that many people see as the "seed
corn" for the salmon runs. By the late 1980s. wild
salmon populations up and down the Pacific Coast
were reported to be at critically low numbers.3 In
1995, returns were worse and the only thing that
appears capable of reversing the declines in the short
term is significant improvement in ocean conditions.
The diversity of salmon populations, which is
key to their long term viability, is tied in part to the
availability of diverse, connected habitats. Different
salmon populations are genetically adapted to dif-
ferent tributaries. While the relationships among
these populations are not entirely understood, sci-
entists theorize that although salmon populations
are adapted to local tributaries, they are also part of
what is called "metapopulations." an aggregation of
smaller populations that mix. stray and support
each other. When one population is weak. stronger
populations can send recruits to help rebuild them.
The diversity of populations is thought to con-
tribute to the long-term strength and resilience of
the metapopulation. 4 For metapopulations to func-
tion, they need diverse, healthy habitats in some
proximity to each other.
Human development has left very few healthy.
connected salmon habitat.5 A good deal of salmon
habitat was degraded in the nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries.6 Much more habitat-in the
neighborhood of 30-40 percent of the habitat that
was accessible-has been blocked by high dams
built after 1930, and these habitat were further
degraded by water and land activities after that time.
Salmon habitat has become highly fragmented-a
stream reach here and a reach there, far removed
from each other. When there is so little connection
between the fragments, the interchange that defines
metapopulations is thought to be compromised.
3. See Willa Nehisen et al.. Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads.
Stocks at Risk From California. Oregon. Idaho and Washington, 16
FiSHERs 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1991).
4. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. UPSTR M. SALM.ON
AND SOCIETY IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 135 (1995); RETURN TO THE
RIVER. supra note 1. at 76.
5. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. supra note 4. at 58.
6. Joseph E. Taylor III. Making Salmon: Economy. Culture
and Science in the Oregon Fishenes. Precontact to 1960 (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Washington).
7. The best accounts are Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel K
Conner. The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Consenation and Allocation
of a Transboundary Common Property Resource. 32 KANsA s L REv. 17.
48-61 (1983) Michael C. Blumm, Hydropowerv. Salmon: The Struggle
of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish Resources With the Federal
Columbia River Power System. II ENv'.. L. 211 (1981).
8. The seminal cases are Sohappy v. Smith. 302 F. Supp. 899
(D. Ore. 1969); United States v. Washington. 384 F Supp. 312 (W.
D. Wash 1974): Washington v. Washington State Commercial
B. Remedial Salmon Legislation
In the 1970s and 1980s, a large body of law and
regulation developed in response to the salmon
declines: 7
" In litigation over fish harvest in the
Columbia River and Puget Sound,
Indian tribes established the nght to
harvest up to half of the salmon runs.8
They also asserted a right to have
salmon habitat protected from degra-
dation.9 The latter principle was not
entirely resolved, but it bears directly
on all activities that affect salmon
habitat. including the operations of
the Columbia River dams. t0
* The Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976ii creat-
ed fishery management councils com-
posed of government agencies and
representatives of user groups to
coordinate fish harvest in the ocean.
* The Salmon and Steelhead Con-
servation Act 12 promised to address
the problem of overlapping and
sometimes conflicting fish and
wildlife agency management junsdic-
tions. This Act also promised (but
failed to deliver) federal funding for
habitat restoration.
* Creating what has turned out to be
the most important source of fish
and wildlife mitigation funding,
Congress enacted the Northwest
Power Act' 3 and a four-state
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 443 U.S. 658 (1979). There is a
large amount of literature on the treaty fishing cases. See. e.g..
FEuxS- COHEN. HANDsooor FEERAL Inoi Lxw 44! (1982). See also
CHALEs F WILirnSON. CJptoSsis THE NEXt MERI LN: LAND, WATER
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WESr 175 (1992). FAY G. COHEN. TREAES O,
TRIAL THE CO:.IINUh'2G COcuTROVEY OVaER NowuHwEsT 1n1D FISHING
RiGHTS (1986)-
9- See United States v Washington. 506 F Supp. 187 (W.D.
Wash,1. appeal dismlWed United States v. Washington, No. 81-3111
(9th Or. Dec. 17. 1984), See also Michael C. Blumm. Why Study
Pacific Salmon Law?. 22 Iomoio L REv. 629. 636-37 (1986).
10- See Authonty of Bonnevle Power Administrator to Participate in
Funding of Program to Help Restore ike Columbia River Anadromous
Fishery. 83 I.D 589 (Nov. 22. 1976).
I - Pub L No 94-265. 90 Stat 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1882 (1996)-
12 Pub L No 9-561.90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
3301-3345 (1996)11
13 See Pub L No. 96-50i. 94 Stat. 2697 (codified at 16
US C 44 839-839 (h)(1996))
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Northwest Power Planning Council to
develop a plan for the Northwest's
energy needs and to offset the fish
and wildlife impacts of the Columbia
River hydropower dams. 14 The result-
ing fish and wildlife program is im-
plemented by hydropower revenues
and the federal agencies that control
the dams, calling for millions of acre-
feet of water to augment river flows
for salmon.
* In 1985, the United States and
Canada signed a treaty designed to
protect each country's ocean salmon
populations from the other country's
fishermen. 15
* In 1986, the federal government, three
Northwest states and the region's
Indian tribes negotiated a settlement
of fish harvest issues in the Columbia
River.i6
* In 1987, the Power Planning Council
adopted a "Protected Areas" program
identifying 44,000 stream miles of
Northwest rivers where new
hydropower facilities should not be
licensed because of potential fish and
wildlife conflicts.
Notwithstanding these developments, wild
salmon declines in the late 1980s were dramatic
14. See Roy Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning Coun-
cil: Its Origins and Future Role, 13 ENVTL. L. 673 (1983): Kai N. Lee, The
Path Along the Ridge, 58 WASH. L. REv. 317 (1983); John M. Volkman,
Rethinking Development in the Western Environment, in BEYOND THE
MYHIC WEST 105, 115-17 (Stuart L. Udall et al. eds., 1990).
15. See Treaty on Pacific Salmon, United States-Canada,
TREAry Doc. No. 99-2 (1985) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644
(1994)). See also Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific
Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENVTL. L.
363 (1986).
16. The Columbia River Fish Management Plan, approved
by the federal distnct court in United States v. State of Oregon,
699 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd 913 E2d 576 (9th Cir. 1990).
For background, see Penny H. Harrison, The Evolution of a New
Comprehensive Plan for Managing Columbia River Anadromous Fish, 16
ENVTL. L. 705 (1986).
17. For example, the proposals of the commission appoint-
ed to develop management recommendations under the Salmon
and Steelhead Conservation Act, the Salmon and Steelhead
Advisory Commission, were reiected by the Secretary of
Commerce. See SALMON & STEELHEAD ADVISORY COMM'N, U.S. NAT.
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., A NEW MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR
ANADROMOUS SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES AND FISHERIES OF THE
and alarming. Some remedial programs functioned
better than others, but all ran into obstacles.i7 A
seven-year drought and persistently poor (for
salmon) ocean conditions followed. Populations
that had looked healthy in 1988 were weak enough
in 1990 to prompt Endangered Species Act peti-
tions.
The Endangered Species Act's reputation as a
"pit bull" preceded it. Immediately after the
Endangered Species Act petitions were filed,
Oregon's Senator Mark Hatfield, a veteran of the
Northwest's wrenching experience with the north-
ern spotted owl Endangered Species Act listings,
urged the region to take early steps to put an
effective recovery plan into place, and if possible,
to moot the petitions. 18 In 1990 and 1991, Senator
Hatfield and the governors of the fouT Northwest
states watched over a mediated process called the
"Salmon Summit" After six months of discus-
sions, summit participants agreed to provide
more water for salmon; federal land managers
strengthened their commitment to address habi-
tat problems on federal lands; and a wide array of
interests were brought into recovery discus-
sions. 19
There were contentious issues the Salmon
Summit could not resolve. How much more water
should be used to augment flows for salmon? What
kinds of structural changes should be made in the
dams? How much farther should fish harvest be
reduced? How could the adverse effects of hatch-
eries be mitigated? For these issues, consensus was
elusive, and the region turned to the Power
Planning Council (Council).
WASHINGTON AND COLUMBIA RIVER CONSERVATION AREAS (19841: Letter
from Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce, to William
Wilkerson, Director. Washington Department of Fisheries (Nov. 5,
1986). The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty has hit a
series of potholes and is reported to be in "grave danger" See
Canada-U. S. salmon pact said to be in peril, DAILY ASrORIAN, April 18,
1996. The Northwest Power Act program has had successes, but
also has come in for its share of criticism. See Michael C. Blumm
& Andy Simrm, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise Hydropower,
Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia River Basin, 21 ENVTL
L. 657 (1991).
18. See Endangered Species Petitions on Columbia and Snake Rivers:
Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee on Small
Business, 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1991).
19. See Oversight Hearing on Petitioned Salmon Stocks for
Endangered Species Listing, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1992), iwo arti-
cles taking very different views of these events were published at
about the time the salmon summit concluded its work, Compare
Blumm & Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise, supra note 17,
with Kai N. Lee, Rebuilding Confidence: Salmon, Science, and Law In the
Columbia Basin. 21 ENVTL. L. 745 (1991).
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In 1991 and 1992, the Council conducted an
administrative rulemaking process 20 that resulted in
The Strategy for Salmon.2 1 The Strategy approved fund-
ing for high-priority habitat projects, including mea-
sures to protect wild stocks from hatchery stocks.
and added about 3 million acre-feet to the 3.45 mil-
lion acre-feet that was already part of the Council's
flow augmentation program. In the Snake River. the
Council accepted the flow augmentation water
offered in the Salmon Summit and added it to the
then-existing program.
However, the Council found that these mea-
sures were not enough, and so it called for evalua-
tions of other salmon recovery options: lowering
reservoir levels to create a faster flowing river;
investment in water efficiencies, water marketing,
and other means to leave more water in rivers for
salmon; and alternative power system operations
that could make it easier to devote the river to serv-
ing fish needs. The Council also called for known-
stock fishing techniques to target strong fish stocks
and help avoid weak fish stocks; closer scrutiny of
hatchery impacts on wild fish populations to pro-
tect weak, wild salmon stocks: and more effective
way to protect fish and wildlife habitat, based on
watershed-wide initiatives. 22
Environmental groups, an Indian tribe and
industrial groups all challenged the Strategy for
Salmon. While the fact that the Council had appar-
ently offended such a wide spectrum of interests
suggested to some that the Council had struck a
balance, in Northwest Resource Infornation Center v.
Northwest Power Planning Council,23 the Ninth Circuit
found the program to be flawed. The court held that
the Council had not made appropriate findings on
20. The Council uses a unique form of rulemaking that ob-
serves specific requirements of the Northwest Power Act (here-
inafter NPA). 16 U.S.C. § 839 (b) (h) (1996). and informal rule-
making procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 5
U.S.C. 553. made applicable to the Council by a separate section
of the NPA, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (b) (d) (),
21. NoRTHwEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. I STRATEGY FOR
SALMON (1992).
22. See generally. NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL. 2
STRATEGY FOR SALMON (1992). For a review of these developments
and their relationship to the Salmon Summit. see Columbia Prer
Basin Salmon Recovery Efforts. Heanngs before the Senate Committe on
Appropnations. 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
23. 35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
24. The Northwest Power Act directs the council to develop
a fish and wildlife program on the basis of "recommendations-
submitted by fish and wildlife agencies, tribes and others The
Council must evaluate the recommendations in light of several
criteria including for example, that the program must -comple-
ment the existing and future activities- of the agencies and tnbes.
16 U.S.C. § 839 (b) (hi (6) (Al. and be consistent with the legal
rights of Indian tribes. 16 U.S.C. § 839 (bi (hi 16) (Di. In saying
the recommendations received in the process, had
not incorporated the findings in the program itself,
and had not made clear the relationship between
the program's specific measures and a system of
biological objectives. This procedural holding was
accompanied by expansive dicta, including an inter-
pretation of the Northwest Power Act under which
the Council would give -a high degree of deference-
to the fish and wildlife agencies' and tribes' judg-
ments on fish and wildlife mitigation. 24 The court
also criticized the scope of the Council's action:
-The Council's approach seems largely to have been
from the premise that only small steps are possible,
in light of entrenched river user claims of economic
hardship.-25
Before the ruling was handed down, the
Council had completed the further evaluations the
Strategy for Salmon had called for, including a scien-
tific context for mainstem measures, and was
poised to make decisions on reservoir drawdowns
and other measures. In December 1994. three
months after the Northwest Resource Information Center
ruling, the Council completed revisions to the
Strategy.2 6 There were major departures in the new
program for the Snake River. First, the Council put
the mainstem measures in an experimental context.
Each measure would be part of a head-to-head eval-
uation of the survival of fish that are transported by
barge and fish that are left in the river. This experi-
mental approach is an aspect of the Council's
.adaptive management' strategy, premised on the
idea that fish and wildlife measures should be seen
as a series of experiments, with formal experimen-
tal designs to help to answer critical questions
about the interaction of humans and the ecosys-
that the Council must accord a high degree of deference to the
fish and wildlife agencies and tnbes. the Northwest Resource
Information Center opinion. Northwest Resources Information
Center v Northwest Power Planning. 35 F3d 1371 19th Cir. 1994).
emphasized a statement made by the chairman of one of the two
house committees that reported on the Northwest Power bill
regarding a provision in the bill that was not adopted. The court
expanded on one part of the legislative statement, that -the
Council should rely heavily on the fish and wildlife agencies
and not try to become a super fish and wildlife entity.' Id. at 1388
(quoting 126 CoNG. REc. E10683 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980)). The
court also discounted another part of the legislator's statement.
that the Acts fish and wildlife criteria were not intended to -pro-
vide a legal basis for challenging the program.- See id. at 1389 n.37
(quoting 126 CONG REc El0683 (daily ed. Nov. 17. 1980) (remarks
of Rep Dingell)). By this route, the dicta conclude that not only
must the Council must accord -a high degree of deference to the
agencies and trbes' judgments. but that the agencies and tribes"
interpretations of the NPAs fish and wildlife provisions are enti-
tled to deference Id at 1388-93.
25 Norrhwst Resource Informain Center. 35 F3d at 1371.
26 See No-nHWEsr PcwER PLA:iuml, CoUicit.. CoLww. RWER
BASIN Fsm AND WILDUFE PROmRA.t (Dec 1994)
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tem.27 By structuring salmon recovery measures as
experiments, the Council can take action and learn
from the results. Although adaptive management
had proved difficult to apply in the mainstem of the
Columbia River,2 8 the Council was determined to
establish an experimental framework for mainstem
measures. The Council invited a group of scientists
to a workshop to identify areas of agreement and
disagreement regarding the effectiveness of flow
augmentation, reservoir drawdowns and barge
transportation. The results of the workshops estab-
lished a framework for experimentation in the main-
stem, which was ultimately included in the Strategy.
Within this experimental context, the Council
proposed to implement and evaluate a series of
mainstem measures: I) a reservoir drawdown pro-
gram for the Lower Snake River dams and the John
Day prolect on the Columbia; 2) reductions in an
Army Corps of Engineers program that barges luve-
nile fish in the Snake River; and 3) efforts to secure an
additional million acre-feet of flow augmentation
water from the Snake River Basin, using market trans-
actions, efficiency efforts and other non-structural
measures. In the Columbia, the Council added anoth-
er 1.3 million acre-feet of water to the salmon flow
program. The Council concluded that fluctuations in
upriver storage reservoirs should be limited to protect
resident fish and wildlife in upriver reservoirs.
The Council program received measured sup-
port from Indian tribes and environmental groups,
and an industry lawsuit was later abandoned.
29
However, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) did not follow the Council's lead on critical
mainstem issues such as barge transportation and
reservoir drawdowns. As a result, federal agencies
were faced with mixed messages regarding salmon
recovery. Moreover, shortly after the Council pro-
gram was adopted, the Council's membership
changed. The new Council asked a group of inde-
pendent scientists to review the scientific basis for
the program. This review is now complete (see dis-
cussion of Return to the River, below) and the Council
expects to consider amending the program in light
of the review. Meanwhile, the long-term strategy for
mainstem measures remains in question.
27. See Kal N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management:
Learning From the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. 16
ENVrL. L. 431 (1986); John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha.
Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon. the Endangered Species
Act and Adaptive Management. 23 ENVTL. L. 1249 (1993).
28. Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 27. at 1249.
29. The Idaho Power Company challenged the amend-
ments. Idaho Power operates the Hells Canyon dams on the
Snake River. A coalition of aluminum companies and other indus-
trial interests moved to intervene in support of Idaho Powers
challenge, while the Yakama Indian Nation and a coalition of
III. The Endangered Species Act Program
While the Council was working its way through
the salmon issues, the NMFS had begun to imple-
ment the Endangered Species Act (ESA). When
Snake River salmon were listed in 1992, many of the
Endangered Species Act's tools were brought into
play: the federal consultation process, critical habi-
tat designation, recovery planning and habitat con-
servation planning. This section reviews these tools
and addresses the question posed by the title of
this article -whether they are adequate for the lob,
A. The Endangered Species Act Tools
I. Federal Consultations on Hydropow,,r System
Operations
By many accounts, the most powerful ESA tool
is the federal agency consultation process mandat-
ed by section 7 of the Act. 30 Section 7 requires fed-
eral agencies proposing to take action that may
adversely affect a listed species to consult with the
relevant federal fish and wildlife agency (the NMFS,
in the case of salmon) to ensure that the proposed
action will not jeopardize the continued existence
of the species or adversely affect its critical habitat.
As part of the consultation process, the NMFS must
issue a Biological Opinion detailing how the pro-
posed action would affect the species. If NMFS
believes the action would leopardize the species, it
must suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives"
that would avoid ]eopardy. 3i
To see how well the process is working with the
salmon listings, it is worth spending some time
examining the consultation process on hydropower
system operations. In 1993, shortly after publication
of the Strategy for Salmon, the NMFS issued its
Biological Opinion on the operation of the federal
Columbia River dams. The opinion added another
two million acre-feet of stored water to the Strategy
for Salmon's Columbia River flows. 32 The Opinion al-
so called for a number of other measures, studies
and restrictions, many similar to the Strategy for
Salmon and some not, and concluded that the dam's
operations would not jeopardize the continued sur-
vival of the species.
environmental fishing organizations moved to Intervene In sup-
port of the Council. After taking a closer look at the Council's
record and the intervenors, Idaho Power withdrew its challenge.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1996).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
32. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIEs ACT (ESA) SECTION 7
CONSULTATION REGARDING 1994-99 OPERATION O7 THE FEDERAL
COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND JUVENILE TRANSPOP-,ATION PROGPM
IN 1994-98. (March 16, 1994).
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The 1993 Biological Opinion was challenged in
court by several environmental groups, Indian
tribes and the Idaho Department of Fish and Game.
In Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine
Fisheries Service, et al.,33 the court faulted the
Biological Opinion and sent it back to the federal
agencies. The holding of the case was technical:
that the Opinion used the wrong baseline from
which to measure the species' decline and relied on
optimistic assumptions about mitigation measures.
The court did not stop at technical defects, howev-
er. It made far-reaching observations on the under-
lying substantive issues, concluding that "[ilnstead
of looking for what can be done to protect the
species from jeopardy, the NMFS and the action
agencies have narrowly focused their attention on
what the establishment is capable of handling with
minimal disruption."34 The court also counseled the
federal parties to open up the process in which the
Biological Opinion had been developed, to ensure
that state fish and wildlife agency and tribal scien-
tists were heard: "The underlying root of the litiga-
tion problem is the feeling of these parties that the
federal government is simply not listening to
them."35
Following the court's rebuke, the federal parties
organized a large-scale consultation process to
work with the states and tribes to reanalyze techni-
cal issues. The process concluded in March 1995.
For the first time, the NMFS found that dam opera-
tions were likely to jeopardize salmon survival. The
1995 Biological Opinion outlined a "reasonable and
prudent alternative"36 that the Service said would
avoid jeopardy, essentially by providing even more
storage water for flow augmentation. Some state
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes remained dis-
satisfied with the process, however, and environ-
mental groups were not persuaded that the opinion
was strong enough. The opinion was challenged in
federal district court in March of 1996. 37
33. 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit remanded the action with instructions to dismiss it as
moot in light of the fact that a new biological opinion had already
been developed by the time of the court of appeals' opinion. See
Idaho Fish & Game Dep't v. National Marine Fisheries Sew., 56
F3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Aluminum Co. of America v.
Bonneville Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1995) (related
litigation involving the federal action agencies' reliance on the
biological opinion); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr. v. National
Marine Fisheries Sew., 56 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1995) (challenge to
the federal agencies' barge transportation program).
34. Idaho Dep't Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900.(D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 1995)
35. Id. at 900.
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While the NMFS's most recent Biological
Opinion and the Power Planning Council fish and
wildlife program have much in common, they differ
in key respects. The Biological Opinion puts more
emphasis on barging juvenile fish and less empha-
sis on improving migrating conditions in the Snake
River. The opinion avoids calling for the acquisition
of significant amounts of water from the Snake River
Basin, and reserves judgment on the advisability of
lowering the level of Snake River reservoirs. Instead
of calling for measures in the Snake River system,
the opinion draws more heavily on storage projects
in the Upper Columbia arm of the system (Grand
Coulee Dam in north-central Washington and Libby
and Hungry Horse Dams in Montana), so that Snake
River fish will find a faster Columbia River when
they emerge from the Snake. However, not only
does this strategy raise a number of issues about
the fate of the Snake River as a home for salmon, it
also raises concerns about impacts to resident fish
and wildlife populations that live in Upper
Columbia reservoirs. Because it focuses on ESA list-
ed species, the Biological Opinion affords no appar-
ent protection for these populations.38
In April 1997, the same federal judge who had
thrown out the Fisheries Service's 1993 Biological
Opinion rejected challenges to the Service's revised
Biological Opinion. In American Rivers v. National
Marine Fisheries Service,39 plaintiff environmental
groups asked the judge to hold that the Fisheries
Service's new Biological Opinion was arbitrary and
capricious, and that the federal agencies had not
implemented the Biological Opinion's reasonable
and prudent alternative. In ruling on the environ-
mental plaintiffs' challenge, the court addressed
two issues: One was the adequacy of the Service's
jeopardy analysis; a second concerned the federal
agencies' implementation of the Biological
Opinion's reasonable and prudent alternative. On
the first issue, the court observed that the new
36. See supra note 31, and related discussion.
37. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv.,
Civ. no. 96-384-MA (D. Or. filed Mar. 13, 1996). The plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment was denied and defendants'
motion for summary judgment was granted. See 109 F.3d 1484,
1490 (9th Cir. 1997).
38. Kootenai River white sturgeon, which are listed as
endangered, affect operations at Montana's Libby Dam. See 59
Fed. Reg. 45,989 (1994). Snail species that inhabit hot springs in
central Idaho also are listed and can affect Snake River flow oper-
ations; bull trout have been the subject of listing petitions, which
the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service has found warranted but pre-
cluded by other priorities.
39. American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service,
Civil No. 96-384-MA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5337 (D. Ore., April 3,
1997).
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Biological Opinion was significantly different from
the Opinion the court had struck down, particularly
in acknowledging the need for substantial change in
the configuration of the Columbia River dams:
"NMFS has concluded that without major modifica-
tions to the Snake and Columbia River dams, it is
unlikely survivals can be sufficiently improved to
ensure that the operation of the FCRPS does not
impede the survival and recovery of listed Snake
River salmon."40 Absent this finding, the court
would have faced a very different issue. The court
also found that the Service had significantly altered
its jeopardy analysis based on its consultations
with the parties, state and tribal fish analysts, and
independent peer review.
2. Critical Habitat Designation
The Endangered Species Act calls for the desig-
nation of critical habitat, i.e., areas that are essen-
tial to the conservation of the species.4 In the
Columbia, the Fisheries Service accompanied its
listing proposal with a request for biological and
economic information regarding critical habitat,
and convened two technical committees to assist
the agency to gather information.4 2 Several years
before the Endangered Species Act listings, the
Power Planning Council had worked with the
region's fish and wildlife agencies, tribes, and the
Bonneville Power Administration to identify "pro-
tected areas"-about 44,000 miles of streams in
which the Council recommended against new
hydropower development in order to protect valu-
able fish and wildlife habitat.4 3 The Fisheries Service
was able to build on this program. An Endangered
Species Act critical habitat proposal was issued in
late 199241 and a final designation was adopted the
next year.4 5 The designations included the spawning
and rearing grounds for the listed populations and
their migration corridors-the same spawning and
rearing tributaries through the mainstems of the
Salmon, Snake and Columbia rivers that had been
designated as "protected areas" by the Power
Planning Council.
Critical habitat includes not just specific areas
that can be drawn on a map, but also "those physi-
40. Id. at* 13.
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(5) & 1533(a)(3) (1996).
42. Critical habitat designation is one of the few places in
the Endangered Species Act process where economics is a deci-
sion factor. An area may be excluded from designation if NMFS
determines that the overall benefits of exclusion outweigh the
benefits of designation, unless exclusion would result in extinc-
tion of the species. See 16 U.S.C. §1532(b)(l)(B)(2).
43. See COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH ,& WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 12.2,
supra note 26.
cal or biological features (I) essential to the conser-
vation of the species and (II) which may require spe-
cial management considerations or protection."46 In
the Endangered Species Act process, there was dis-
cussion in technical committees whether a critical
habitat designation might include, for example, a
particular level of flow as a "physical or biological"
feature essential to the species. However, in the
event, the Fisheries Service listed only the general
habitat characteristics deemed essential to the
species, e.g., substrate, water quality, quantity, tem-
perature and velocity, riparian vegetation and other
factors.
Critical habitat designation must be accompa-
nied by an assessment of the designation's eco-
nomic impacts.47 The Fisheries Service concluded
that designating critical habitat in the Columbia
system would not have a major impact on human
activities. Based on its economic committee's eval-
uation,48 and reasoning that the Act's consultation
process already provided protection against habi-
tat-damaging activities, the Service found that the
economic impact of the proposed designations
were likely to be minor. The Service maintained that
the primary effect of a critical habitat designation
would be to clarify that there must be consultation
regarding federal activities that may affect designat-
ed habitat, assist federal agencies in planning fur-
ther actions, and help focus federal, state and pri-
vate conservation and management actions in
these areas.
The apparent insignificance of the critical habi-
tat process in the Columbia appears paradoxical in
light of the Endangered Species Act's express policy
to take an ecosystem perspective in implementing
the Act. The importance of healthy ecosystem func-
tions is near the core of the ecosystem management
concept.49 There is an obvious overlap between
ecosystem management and the Endangered
Species Act's requirement that critical habitat des-
ignation should protect "physical or biological fea-
tures essential to the conservation of the species."
If the Endangered Species Act were focused first
and foremost on protecting ecosystem functions,
the critical habitat process might identify the fun-
44. See 57 Fed. Reg. 57,051 (1992).
45. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,544 (1993).
46. 15 U. S. C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
47. 15 U. S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
48. DANIEL D. HUPPERT ET AL.. ECONOMIC EFFECrS OF MANAGE-
MENT MEASURES WITHIN THE RANGE OF POTENTIAL CRITICAL HABITAT FOR
SNAKE RIVER ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SALMON SPECIES (1992).
49. See Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Eco-
logical Society of American Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem
Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 668-69 (1996).
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damental conditions toward which the Endangered
Species Act process would be geared. However, this
is not what has happened in the Columbia. Rather,
decisions are aimed at reducing salmon mortality
levels at various points in the salmon migration,
which is consistent with a focus on listed species
rather than the ecological processes on which
species depend.
3. Recovery Planning
James Watt once characterized recovery plans
as "the real payoff under the ESA." The success of
the Act, he said, "is really measured by the success
of recovery efforts."50 In practice, however, recovery
plans have a modest record. They have little legal
force, binding only the agency that promulgates
them.5 1 They tend to take a long time to develop
and, once developed, do little more than maintain
species at the levels that required listing in the first
place. 52 A 1993 study suggested that recovery plans
generally do not aim for "recovery" as the term is
defined by the Endangered Species Act. The study
reviewed all 314 available recovery plans approved
by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service as of August, 1991, and
found that for species for which population data
were available, 28% had recovery goals set at or
below the population size that existed at the time of
listing.53 The Fish and Wildlife Service's own report
to Congress in 1990 appears to reflect the same
conclusion:
A more realistic measure of the Service's
recovery efforts than the number of species
delisted is probably the proportion of list-
ed species whose status has been stabi-
lized, particularly among species that are
50. Letter from James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, to
Hon. John B. Breaux, U.S. Senate (Feb. 8, 1982), reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 2807, 2838.
51. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535 (1 lth Cir.
1996).
52. See U. S. GENERALACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM
(1988); U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
TYPES AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS (1992).
53. Timothy H. Tear et al., Status and ProspectsforSuccess of the
Endangered Species Act: A Look at Recovery Plans, 262 SCIENCE 976 (Nov.
12, 1993).
54. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS: ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES
RECOVERY PROGRAM 3 (1990).
55. The Secretary is authorized to retain help from outside
the agency, and may form recovery teams to provide advice on
recovery plan development and implementation. See 16 U.S.C. §
1633(f)(2). Recovery teams may be drawn from experts within or
habitat-limited and thus more vulnerable
to changes in their environment. Main-
tenance of remaining populations of listed
species and prevention of their extinction
is a basic objective of the program.5 4
In the Columbia River, the Fisheries Service
appointed a volunteer recovery team of non-govern-
ment scientists, engineers and an economist in
early 1992.5 5 The team compiled information, con-
sulted with various parties and, in late 1993, sub-
mitted its recommendations to the Fisheries
Service. The Fisheries Service gave its recovery team
relatively free license to speak publicly;56 various
team members lobbied for their recommendations
not just with the agency, but in the region and in
Congress.
In the spring of 1995, the Fisheries Service
issued a draft recovery plan.5 7 It incorporated
measures from the Service's Biological Opinions.
It addressed questions of institutional relation-
ships and governance: proposing that the
National Marine Fisheries Service create a
Salmon Recovery Implementation Team, a
Scientific Advisory Panel, a dispute resolution
process, and other measures. 58 In many areas, the
proposals of the Fisheries Service, the recovery
team and the Power Planning Council's fish and
wildlife program are aligned. On some critical
issues-the role of barge transportation, reser-
voir drawdowns and water for flow augmenta-
tion-they still differ. A final recovery plan has
not yet been adopted.
4. Habitat Conservation Planning
There is a persuasive argument that nonfederal
involvement in species recovery is essential if listed
species are to recover:
outside the agency. Team recommendations are purely advisory.
See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR
PLANNING AND COORDINATING RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND
THREATENED SPECIES § II. at 1 (1990).
56. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service guidelines emphasize
that recovery team recommendations do not represent the posi-
tion of the agency; recovery teams may or may not be asked to
prepare final recovery plans; without the approval of the agency.
recovery team members may not not seek to influence agency
policy outside agency channels; and recovery plans are final only
when they are adopted by the agency. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR RECOVERY PLANNING AND
COORDINATING RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES,
app. 11 (1990). See also NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. &
NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV. OFFICE OF PROTECTED RESOURCES,
RECOVERY PLANNING GUIDELINES 3 (1992).
57. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., PROPOSED RECOVERY
PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON (1995).
58. Id. § II, at 1.
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ITIhe conservation of biodiversity will
require a financial commitment that can-
not be provided by the public sector alone.
Private sector contributions to endangered
species conservation far surpass the feder-
al endangered species budget .... Given
the reality of an annual $300 billion federal
deficit and similar fiscal problems at the
state and local government level, it is
doubtful that the public sector contribu-
tion to endangered species conservation
will increase dramatically.59
The habitat conservation planning provisions
of the Endangered Species Act provide a way to
bring private parties into species recovery. Private
development that "harms" a listed species (harm
may include habitat destruction or modification) is
an unlawful "taking" under the Act, punishable by
civil and criminal penalties.60 In order to proceed, a
private developer must obtain an "incidental take"
permit. Such permits are issued if a privately
designed and funded habitat conservation plans is
approved. These plans are intended to offset any
incidental taking by promoting conservation of the
species.6'
Supporters of the habitat conservation plan-
ning provisions argue that this process provides
important opportunities for reconciling economic
activities with endangered species protection.62 For
one thing, habitat conservation plans are specifical-
ly authorized to address unlisted species,63 and for
this reason they can be more responsive to ecosys-
tem considerations than can other processes under
the Act.
There have been regional and national consul-
tations regarding the possibility that the Power
Planning Council's fish and wildlife program could
be structured to satisfy the habitat conservation
planning requirements of section 10. Would it be
possible to develop a long-term, four-state, multi-
species plan backed up by the financial, contractual
59. Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictabil-
ity: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered species Act of
1973, 21 ENVTL L. 605.656 (1991).
60. Section 9 prohibits "taking" listed species. 16 U.S.C. §
1538. This prohibition extends to both federal and nonfederal
actions, including private activities. "Taking" is defined broadly, to
include "harm" to the species. Id. § 1532(19). "Harm" may include
harm to habitat (not just critical habitat) if it would adversely
affect listed species. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). For a detailed explanation of
habitat conservation plans, see MICHAEL 1. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING
CONFLICTS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING PROCESS (199 1). Another avenue for private
and other implementation commitments that sec-
tion 10 seems to require? To date, these questions
have been raised but not answered.
There are significant efforts to develop smaller
scale habitat conservation plans in the Columbia.
Several watershed groups are talking to the
Fisheries Service about developing watershed-wide
habitat conservation plans. The public utility dis-
tricts that own hydropower dams in the Mid-
Columbia area of Washington are working with the
Fisheries Service on a plan. The Fisheries Service,
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Environmental
Protection Agency have worked toward an integrat-
ed set of guidelines for habitat conservation plan-
ning efforts to satisfy the Endangered Species Act
and the Clean Water Act. The U. S. Fish and Wildlife
Service is working with private parties and local
watershed groups to facilitate the development of
plans for spotted owls, with incidental benefits for
other species such as salmon. While progress in
habitat conservation planning comes piece by
piece, these efforts are worth watching.
5. Broader Effects of the Act
Not all the Endangered Species Act's effects
can be seen by examining individual tools; some
effects are apparent only when the Act is considered
wholesale. Of these, one of the most important is
what has been called the Act's "incentive structure":
the "perception that the ESA's mandate is absolute
and nonnegotiable," which prompts others to
address species declines.64
This incentive structure has played a major role
in the Columbia River. It is an oversimplification to
say that the Endangered Species Act caused all the
salmon-related developments of 1991-1994. Other
processes did much of the heavy lifting-the
region's political leaders in the Salmon Summit, the
Power Planning Council and state and tribal fish
managers in the Northwest Power Act processes, lit-
igants in the court proceedings of 1994, and a wide
range of interested parties throughout. It may well
developers is section 7 of the Act, under which a private develop-
er seeking a federal permit may secure an exemption through the
Act's consultation process. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). This exemp-
tion also requires a conservation plan. See id.
62. BEAN FT AL., supra note 61.
63. H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 30.
(1982) reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2860, 2871
(1982).
64. STEVEN YAFFEE & JUuA WONDOLLECK, SCHOOL OF NATURAL
RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, NEGOTIATING
SURVIVAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL USE OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIOUEs FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN
ENDANGERED SPECIES AND DEVELOPMENT 55 (1994).
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be that the salmon declines, the Northwest Resource
Information Center ruling or the Power Planning
Council's program would have prompted these
efforts even if there were no Endangered Species
Act. Yet it is certainly true that the Endangered
Species Act provided the immediate impetus to
engage these processes.
The Act's second broad effect has been a shift in
the burden of proof. Protecting ecosystems from
unwanted effects of new development can be heavy
work. Often, the short-term economic benefits of
development are obvious, while the benefits of
environmental recovery are harder to predict, rarely
appraisable in economic terms, and easy to dis-
count. Although the Northwest Power Act tended to
shift this burden, the Endangered Species Act list-
ings made the shift unmistakable. For essentially
the first time, proponents of development must
carry a burden of proof in which they must contend
with the uncertainty involved in predicting biologi-
cal impacts. A fishery management agency has to be
satisfied that proposed federal activities will not
jeopardize listed species. Moreover, one of the sur-
prising aspects of the Columbia River process is
that this shift has occurred not just with proposed
federal projects, but for on-going federal activities
such as management of the Columbia River
hydropower facilities. Because a federal plan for
operating the hydropower system must be devel-
oped each year, system operations too must carry
the burden of avoiding jeopardy to the species.
These broad effects-the Act's incentive struc-
ture and the shift in the burden of proof favoring
species protection-may well be the most signifi-
cant Endangered Species Act's tools.
C. The Limitations of the Tools
These tools are impressive, but in judging how
far the Act can protect diverse species, it is also
important to understand their limitations. This sec-
tion reviews some of these limitations: the Act's
focus on listed species rather than ecosystem func-
tions; the emphasis on federal activities; the con-
straints imposed by other laws; the priority on
avoiding jeopardy to listed species rather than
recovery; and other limitations.
65. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 193 (1966).
66. See id. at 253.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b). In addition, the consultation regu-
lations require federal agencies to consider "the direct and indi-
rect effects of Itheirl actionlsl on the species or critical habitat,
together with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or
interdependent with that action... ." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
68. Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection
of Biological Diversity. 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991); Michael L.
1. The Focus on Species.
One of the important limitations of the Colum-
bia River salmon recovery effort is that it is focused
on salmon, not ecosystems or biodiversity. Bio-
diversity protection implies protection for whole
communities of organisms, what Aldo Leopold
described as the "hundred distinctive species.., all
interlocked in one humming community of co-oper-
ations and competitions, one biota."65 To conserva-
tion biologists, microorganisms may be more sig-
nificant than animals, and the overall structure and
complexity of an ecological system are more impor-
tant than individual species.6 In contrast, species
protection tends to emphasize what Leopold called
"show pieces": individual species like salmon, which
people treasure. In focusing on show pieces, we pay
attention to one set of issues and neglect others
that may be more important.
The Endangered Species Act does not com-
pletely ignore the importance of ecosystems. One of
the Act's purposes is to "provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species or
threatened species depend may be preserved."67 For
many years, however, this seemed to be primarily a
rhetorical principle, and critics contended that the
Act actually diverted attention from more the im-
portant task of preserving biodiversity.68 This
emphasis may be changing. In a July, 1994 policy
statement, the Departments of Interior and
Commerce committed to develop recovery plans in
a way that "restores, reconstructs, or rehabilitates
the structure, distribution, connectivity and func-
tion upon which.., listed species depend."69 How-
ever, the Act's federal agency consultation process
remains focused on individual species and to this
point there has been no explicit attempt to take an
ecosystem approach to federal consultations on the
Columbia.
2. The Emphasis on Federal Resources and
Activities
One of the limitations in the Endangered Species
Act's consultation process is its emphasis on federal
resources and activities rather than the broader col-
lection of federal, state and private activities that an
ecosystem approach to restoration would suggest.
Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call For
Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENVTL L. I1I, 148-155
(1990); Suzanne Winckler, Stopgap Measures: Preserving the Ecosystems
as a Means of Wildlife Conservation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 74, 78 (Jan.
1992).
69. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEPT INTERIOR, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE & NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV.. ENDANGERED
AND THREATENED WILDLIFE AND PLANTS: NOTICE OF INTERAGENCY
COOPERATIVE POLICY FOR THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT, 59 Fed. Reg. 34274 (1994).
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The point is illustrated by the contrast between the
Endangered Species Act Biological Opinion's
approach to the Snake River and the approach taken
in the Power Planning Council's 1994 program. The
Council's 1994 program emphasizes solutions for
Snake River fish in the Snake River Basin. Not only
does the program call for Snake River reservoir draw-
downs, but it proposes to use hydropower revenues
to fund water leases, water conservation and other
measures that could leave an additional million acre-
feet in the Snake River for salmon. The Biological
Opinion offers limited Snake River measures and
instead relies more heavily on transportation and
infusions of Columbia River water to augment flows.
In one sense, these differences are predictable
because some of the measures proposed by the
Power Planning Council involve private property
interests-Snake River water rights. The ESA can't do
much where private property interests are involved.
Even if this water could be secured, in order to use it
for salmon it would have to be "shaped" through pri-
vately-managed hydropower projects. The number of
hurdles that would have to be leaped-the legal,
political and social barriers to water acquisition, and
the difficulty of shaping any water that is acquired-
is daunting. Seeing these obstacles, the Fisheries
Service "reasonable and prudent alternative" for river
operations does not count on this water. Because the
Columbia is less affected with private claims, it is eas-
ier for the Fisheries Service to tap. The Biological
Opinion follows a path of less resistance, which leads
to federal resources and activities. The Power
Planning Council saw the same obstacles, but chose
to attempt to overcome them.
The Endangered Species Act approach points
to a key problem for ecosystem recovery. The sal-
mon ecosystem is a patchwork of federal and pri-
vate property interests. The fact that the Endanger-
ed Species Act has no way to cope with this patch-
work is hardly surprising. Yet, if an ecosystem ap-
proach is essential, some way must be found to pro-
vide an ecosystem for fish even in the face of divid-
ed jurisdictions and diverse property interests. 70
3. The Constraints of Existing Law
A third limitation in the Endangered Species
Act consultation process is that much of the prob-
lem faced by salmon is due to development that has
already occurred. Where ecosystem recovery
requires that development be undone, legislation is
likely to be required and the Endangered Species
Act cannot require legislation.
70. See John M. Volkman & Kai N. Lee, The Owl and Minerva:
Ecosystem Lessons From the Columbia, 92 1. FORESTRY 48 (1994).
The problem is illustrated by the reservoir
drawdown debate. Reservoir drawdown advocates
argue that lower reservoirs will increase the speed
of the river (hence of fish migrating downstream)
and help reestablish productive riparian areas at
the edge of the river-a benefit to fish and wildlife,
listed and otherwise. But drawdowns require signif-
icant changes in the dams themselves. Depending
on their nature and timing, drawdowns could inter-
fere with and perhaps preclude river transportation.
Even intermediate-level drawdowns can adversely
affect the operation of juvenile and adult fish pas-
sage facilities at the dams. As noted above, the
Power Planning Council program calls for draw-
downs while the National Marine Fisheries Service
remains undecided. Congress, seeing risks and
uncertainty, has withheld funding for studies of
some drawdown evaluations.
If the Endangered Species Act process endors-
es drawdowns, implementation would probably
require congressional action, either through appro-
priations or authorizing legislation. Biological opin-
ions do not bind Congress. For proposals such as
reservoir drawdowns, the Endangered Species Act
can provide impetus for change, but it cannot
require change.
4. The Difference Between Avoiding Jeopardy and
Recovering Species
It is a commonplace that most of the muscle in
the Endangered Species Act is in its federal agency
consultation process. Yet, the consultation process
aims at avoiding species extinction rather than
restoring species to healthy levels.7' So far, this
commonplace has been borne out in the Columbia
River. The Act's Biological Opinions are making
themselves strongly felt in a variety of federal activ-
ities: in the operation of the hydropower system, in
habitat management and elsewhere. But what the
Endangered Species Act is good at-reshaping fed-
eral activity that jeopardizes species-does not add
up to species (or ecosystem) recovery.
5. Procedural Limitations
A fifth issue in the Endangered Species Act
consultation process is procedural. The consulta-
tion process includes the federal agency that is
proposing to act and the agency that administers
the Act, in this case the National Marine Fisheries
Service. If there is reason to think that a federally-
licensed, privately-developed project will affect a
listed species, a federal permit or license applicant
71. See, e.g.. DANIEL ROHLF. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A
GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 29 (1989).
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may also participate. 72 However, there is no explicit
provision for participation by a broader range of
parties.
There is a rationale for a relatively closed
process: the consultation process is supposed to
last for only 90 days and broad participation could
make this impossible, particularly if involving out-
side parties requires compliance with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. 73 The judgments that are
made in the consultation process are primarily sci-
entific and technical, an area where expertise would
seem more appropriate than the views of interested
parties.
In the Columbia River, however, a closed
process poses special problems. For ten years
before the Endangered Species Act listings, the
Columbia River Indian tribes, the Power Planning
Council, the region's fish and wildlife agencies, util-
ities, environmental groups, and others worked to
open up the federal process in which river manage-
ment decisions were made. The result was no doubt
messy-endless meetings, reams of issue papers,
noisy debate and friction-but the decision making
process was at least accessible. Under the Endan-
gered Species Act process, interested parties,
unable to watch or participate in the decision mak-
ing process, have had little trust in agency determi-
nations. Indeed, the court in Idaho Fish and Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Service attributed the
hydropower litigation to this factor as much as any
other: "The underlying root of the litigation problem
is the feeling of these parties that the federal gov-
ernment is simply not listening to them."7 4
The reality is that the problem is not just pro-
cedural. Some of those affected by Endangered
Species Act decisions are not just looking for a
process in which they can make their concerns
known, but a process in which their concerns will be
accommodated. If the problem were only procedur-
al, it might be easier to address. The Administration
has adopted a policy intended to involve a broader
range of interested parties in recovery plan devel-
72. See 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(3) as amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926,
19939 (1986) (Endangered Species Act, § 7(a)(3) Interagency
Cooperation).
73. See 5 U.S.C. 2 (1993). Several Endangered Species Act
processes have run afoul of the Advisory Committee Act, see
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
No. 93-AR-2322-S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LExis 20322, at *6 (N.D. Ala.
Dec. 22. 1993) (Fish and Wildlife Service enjoined from "publish-
ing, employing and relying upon the Advisory Committee report.
• . for any purpose whatsoever, directly or indirectly, in the
process of determining whether or not to list the Alabama stur-
geon as an endangered species"); Northwest Forest Resource
Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1015 (D.D.C. 1994) (declarato-
ry judgment that Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment
Team was an advisory committee that should have been consti-
opment. 75 The Columbia River process is being
opened up. The consultation process convened by
the parties following the court's opinion brought
many state and tribal parties to the table.7 6 Since
1995 the Fisheries Service has made a concerted
effort to bring state and tribal fishery managers into
an organized structure for hydropower system oper-
ations and recovery plan implementation. But, in
1997 after the federal court upheld the Fisheries
Service Biological Opinion on hydropower opera-
tions based in part on the Service's implementation
process, the process began to fall apart. The State of
Montana withdrew, saying that the process had
failed to account for resident fish and other values
residing in its headwater reservoirs. Montana's seat
was still cooling when the four Columbia River
treaty tribes withdrew. "The process does not facili-
tate collaborative *decision making among sover-
eigns," said the director of the tribes' fish commis-
sion. "It only provides a shield to cover ongoing fed-
eral hegemony."77 These things are evidence not
just of a procedural failing in the law, but a range of
deeper concerns: the concerns of headwater areas
that are taxed by downriver power, flood control,
and salmon flow augmentation uses; the sense of
Montana and the tribes that their sovereignty is
being treated too lightly; the tension between the
tribes' interest in fish harvest and the Endangered
Species Act's interest in protecting particular, list
fish populations; and, possibly, the tribes' sense
that the federal process is not headed toward
salmon recovery, but continued decline.
6. Broader Limitations of the Act
Just as the Endangered Species Act has had
broader effects than can be attributed to any specif-
ic tool, some of the Act's limitations are broader
than the specifics just detailed. For example, the
fact that the Act is powerful and is perceived as
uncompromising can generate political opposition.
That the Endangered Species Act program is feder-
al can compound this mistrust. The more exclusive-
tuted and conducted under the Advisory Committee Act).
74. Id. at 36-37.
75. See Notice of Interagency. Cooperative Policy on
Recovery Plan Participation and Implementation Under the
Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34272 (1994).
76. A challenge to the process based on its failure to
observe the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
was rejected in Aluminum Co. of America v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv., 92 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 1996).
77. Ted Strong, Executive Director, Columbia River
lntertribal Fish Commission, quoted in Trial sovereignty, treaty rights at
core of tribes' rejection of NMFS's salmon management forum, THE
NORTHWEST SALMON RECOVERY REPORT, May 30, 1997, at 1I.
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ly federal the process is, the deeper the mistrust.
And while some of this mistrust is unavoidable, the
Act's procedural limitations fuel the fire. In a sense,
these effects are the converse of the Act's "incentive
structure:" the Act's most forceful characteristics
generate the most forceful opposition.
The fact that the Act takes little account of eco-
nomic considerations 78 reflects problems of a differ-
ent kind. Species are in trouble because of the habi-
tat impacts of economic development. If the
Endangered Species Act were well funded (which it
is not in most parts of the country),79 it might con-
tend with some of the effects of this development.
But there are limits to the effectiveness of even the
best-funded regulatory programs. Acknowledging
this, some students of the Endangered Species Act
have suggested that the Act's regulatory tools
should be augmented with economic incentives, so
that economics work for- species recovery.80
Addressing economic problems of this kind
requires tools that are rarely in evidence in agency-
administered species conservation processes-
analytical capacity to explore the economic implica-
tions of alternative recovery strategies, financing to
reshape existing development, and economic
incentives for appropriate development. The En-
dangered Species Act has not had these tools in
abundance, and no one has a very clear idea of
whether they could compete with the powerful
engines of economic development. Yet, ignoring
economic issues simply means that large obstacles
to recovery remain unaddressed.
IV. The Endangered Species Act, Ecosystem
Science and the Northwest Energy System
With all its assets and liabilities, the Endangered
Species Act is an extremely important factor in
Columbia River salmon policy. But some changes will
be required if it is to foster ecosystem recovery.
Shifting the direction of the Endangered Species Act
78. The Endangered Species Act requires critical habitat
designation to be accompanied by an assessment of economic
effects. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Reasonable and prudent alter-
natives under § 7 of the Act must be "economically and techni-
cally feasible." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. The Act also requires an esti-
mate of the cost of recovery plans. See 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)(I)(B)(iii).
79. There are several analyses of the funding history. See
FAITH CAMPBELL, The Appropriations History, reprinted in BALANCING ON
THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 134 (1991); Michael I. Bean. Issues and
Controversies in the Forthcoming Reauthorization Battle, 9 ENDANGERED
SPECIES UPDATE 1 (1991).
80. See Jim McKinney, et al., Economic Incentives to Preserving
Endangered Species Habitat and Biodiversity on Private Lands, in BUILDING
process away from individual species poses a particu-
lar problem for an Act whose tools are keyed to
species. Even apart from this limitation, the Act will,
as ever, run against the enormous momentum of eco-
nomics and status quo salmon policy. This section dis-
cusses some of the shapes these challenges may take.
A. Salmon and Ecosystem Science: Return to the
River
For decades, salmon mitigation programs have
relied on technological surrogates for salmon habi-
tat-barges to transport fish down an increasingly
inhospitable river, hatcheries to feed harvesters'
appetite for fish, mechanical screens to keep fish
away from turbines, and other engineering solu-
tions. The assumption has been that these techno-
logical methods will be enough to maintain reason-
ably productive salmon populations. But these
solutions have largely ignored the importance of
natural ecosystem processes.
Return to the River, a 1996 report from a group of
independent scientists convened by the Power
Planning Council, suggests that continuing a tech-
nology-based approach to salmon recovery will lead
to the extinction of wild salmon runs by the end of
the next century.8' Over the long term, according to
the report, salmon recovery requires restoration of
natural functions:
The history of salmon restoration is rooted
in technology, such as bypass facilities and
hatcheries. [We recommend] keeping the
salmon in their habitat and letting the river
do the work.82
To avoid continuing extinction, Return to the River
urges attention to all parts of the salmon ecosys-
tem, especially measures to restore interconnecting
salmon habitats, natural stream channels, and eco-
logical processes that produce nutrients that
salmon need for feeding, resting and spawning.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (Wendy E.
Hudson, ed. 1993) (hereinafter BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT); Michael I. Bean, Incentive-Based
Approaches to Conserving Red-Cockaded Woodpeckers in the Sandhills of
North Carolina, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT; Walter V. Reid. Creating Incentives for Conserving
Biodiversity, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT; Randal O'Toole, Building Incentives Into the Endangered
Species Act, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT; lames Baden, Toward a True ESA: An Ecological
Stewardship Act, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT.
81. RETURN TO THE RIVER, supra note 1.
82. Id.
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Return to the River's prescription is more ambigu-
ous than it may sound. The report does not suggest
that the the river must return to its pre-develop-
ment condition in order for salmon to survive. Nor
does it try to spell out exactly how far toward those
conditions the river would have to return. Rather,
the report suggests a direction more than a destina-
tion. If productive salmon populations are to be
reestablished, the report urges, the region has to
restore some of the river's natural functions. This is
an important statement: it tells us to abandon the
idea that we can either stand pat with existing mit-
igation programs or undertake new development
expecting to offset it with traditional forms of
salmon mitigation. It tells us that we must put more
back into the river than we are accustomed to take
out. But it does not say how far in that direction, or
how fast we need to go. It also does not tell us that
some degree of reliance on technological solutions
should not be part of the prescription.
Given these ambiguities, an ecosystem ap-
proach may pose many of the same dilemmas that
we have faced for the last several decades of salmon
policy. Salmon will continue to be a central focus in
any ecosystem recovery process on the Columbia
River because of their legal and cultural impor-
tance. The question is whether ecosystem science
can begin to turn the direction of policy so that
rehabilitation of natural ecosystem functions,
rather than survival trends of individual popula-
tions, is the lodestar for recovery. At best, however,
this shift will entail an ambiguous balance between
rehabilitation of natural systems and refinement of
technological surrogates, with the balance moving
progressively toward the former.
This shift is a difficult prospect for both the
Endangered Species Act and the Northwest Power
Act processes. The Endangered Species Act process
will face one of its own internal contradictions: can
a law designed to protect particular species support
a recovery program that is aimed primarily at pro-
tecting ecosystem functions? The National Marine
Fisheries Service recovery plan, which is in draft,
will likely have to consider this question and the
specific implications of Return to the River before the
plan is made final. For its part, the Power Planning
Council plans to reopen its Fish And Wildlife
Program on the basis of Return to the River, and in
doing so the Council will be faced with all of the
dilemmas that lurk in the idea of ecosystem reha-
bilitation.
83. Until the amendment, the Northwest Power Act had not
explicitly recognized a Council role in program implementation,
but had recognized a role for the Council in planning, see 16 U.S.C.
Both processes will face risky and ambiguous
choices. While an ecosystem approach has consid-
erable appeal, it is possible that we could throw
away our technological crutches but will not be able
to do enough in the river to make a real difference.
Or that throwing away crutches will be accompanied
by a disastrous downturn in ocean conditions that
we erroneously ascribe to the lack of crutches. Or
that we will take too long to restore connections
between habitats and lose the opportunity to
reestablish healthy metapopulations of salmon. All
of which will suggest caution in abandoning artifi-
cial supports. If we retain technologically-oriented
programs, we divert resources from rehabilitating
natural riverine processes. So, for the longer term a
shift toward ecosystem processes has to acquire a
momentum of its own. The question is how such
momentum can be generated.
B. New Scientific Scrutiny of Fish and Wildlife
Expenditures
In early 1996, the Power Planning Council and
the National Marine Fisheries Service impaneled a
joint science board for the two agencies, called the
Independent Scientific Advisory Board. Most of the
board's membership was taken from the
Independent Scientific Group-authors of Return to
the River. The board's role was strengthened in late
1996, when an Energy and Water Development
Appropriations bill required the Power Planning
Council to oversee proposals for Bonneville fish and
wildlife funding, with advice from a panel of inde-
pendent scientists and peer reviewers. 83 The
Council appointed most of the members of the
Independent Scientific Advisory Board to act as the
review panel. Recommendations of the Panel and
the peer review groups are to consider whether
"projects: are based on sound science principles;
benefit fish and wildlife, and have a clearly defined
objective and outcome with provisions for monitor-
ing and evaluation of results." In reviewing the
advice of the Panel and peer review groups and in
making its own recommendations regarding Bonne-
ville funding, the Council must "consider the impact
of ocean conditions," and "determine whether the
projects employ cost effective measures to achieve
program objectives." The Council must explain in
writing if it decides not to incorporate a recommen-
dation of the Panel.
Accordingly, for the first time a group of inde-
pendent scientists committed to ecosystem reha-
§ 839b(h)(l)-(9), and oversight, see id. at § 839b(i).
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bilitation as the primary route to salmon recovery is
in a position to advise the region on recovery strat-
egy (through Return to the River), implementation of
the Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power
Act programs (as the Independent Scientific
Advisory Board), and Bonneville Power Admin-
istration's fish and wildlife expenditures (through
the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
bill). While this development holds promise for
ecosystem recovery, it also enlarges prospects for
conflict with the way river operations and fishery
mitigation programs are currently run.
C. A River and an Energy System in Transition
Recent upheavals in the electric energy indus-
try pose important questions regarding how ecosys-
tem recovery might be financed and managed.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the electric power in-
dustry began a transition from its traditional status
as a regulated industry, to a competitive industry.8 4
For the first time, the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion, which finances the bulk of the salmon recovery
program, was expected to compete for customers.85
Faced with this transition, Bonneville was concern-
ed that it would have to bear escalating costs that it
could not control, such as those for fish and wildlife
recovery. In 1995 and 1996, with Congress threaten-
ing to enact a cap on Bonneville's fish and wildlife
expenses, the Clinton Administration established a
six-year budget for Bonneville fish and wildlife fund-
ing.86 The budget was established through a federal
inter-agency agreement in which the Power
84. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy
Policy Act of 1992-Watershed for Competition In the Wholesale Power
Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (1993).
85. See Timothy A. Johnson, Coping with Change: Energy, Fish
and the Bonneville Power Administration, 26 ENVTL. L. 589 (1996).
86. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
ARMY, THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR CONCERNING THE BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMINISTRATION'S FINANCIAL COMMITMENT FOR THE COLUMBIA RIVER
BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE COSTS (Sept. 16, 1996). The September
1996 Memorandum of Agreement puts the finishing touches on a
draft agreement negotiated by the National Marine Fisheries
Service, the Bonneville Power Administration and the chairman
of the Northwest Power Planning Council in the fall of 1995 in
response to congressional pressure to protect Bonneville's fin-
ances. The Administration's Office of Management and Budget
endorsed the draft agreement as "providing greater financial cer-
tainty to BPA and its customers relating to its fish and wildlife
obligations while simultaneously assuring that the 1995 Bio-
logical Opinion and the Northwest Power Planning Council's Fish
and Wildlife Program will be implemented in a way which helps
assure recovery of the dwindling salmon runs." Letter from Alice
Rivlin to Hon. Mark Hatfield, United States Senate (Oct. 24, 1995)
Ihereinafter Rivlin Letterl. The Agreement is part of a larger pack-
age of measures intended to guarantee Bonneville's health.
Planning Council and the region's Indian tribes
were active participants but not signatories. The
Agreement commits Bonneville to use $252 million
per year in hydropower revenues for fish and wildlife
projects arising under the Council program and the
ESA Biological Opinion. In addition, Bonneville
agrees to bear the financial consequences of imple-
menting the Biological Opinion's river operations-
flow and spill. Finally, under certain circumstances
Bonneville may tap a federal "contingency fund:"
several hundred million dollars in Treasury credits
ascribed to Bonneville's having financed fish and
wildlife measures not allocable to the dams' hydro-
power features.87 The U. S. Treasury and the Office
of Management and Budget, the jealous guardians
of the contingency fund, played significant roles in
the agreement's development. Not incidentally, the
Agreement commits the federal agencies to collab-
orate much more closely with the region in devel-
oping federal funding requests. The Agreement also
incorporates an Annex in which the parties agree to
continue to improve the region's ability to prioritize
budget expenditures and monitor and evaluate
progress in fish and wildlife recovery.
The Memorandum of Agreement adds an ele-
ment of stability to fish and wildlife costs that is
important to power system operators. It is a limited
form of stability, however: it is an interagency
understanding; it will last only through 2001; and
even during this period it is possible that a court or
Congress could impose additional fish and wildlife
obligations on Bonneville. Perhaps most important,
87. The Columbia River dams were authorized for multiple
purposes: hydropower generation, flood control, navigation and
other purposes. Under the Northwest Power Act, the Bonneville
Power Administration is authorized to allocate its fish and
wildlife expenditures "among the various hydroelectric projects.
.. jand] to the various project purposes in accordance with exist-
ing accounting procedures for the Federal Columbia River Power
System." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(C). The House Interior
Committee report's analysis of this provisions noted that "all
expenditures by BPA are to be made on a reimbursable basis vis-
a-vis other project purposes, although BPA will have the flexibil-
ity to treat expenditures in excess of its allocated share as being
payments for other project costs for which BPA is responsible
under existing law." 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Rept. 96-976, pt. 2 at 45.
The section its legislative history have been interpreted as autho-
rizing Bonneville to credit fish and wildlife expenditures for which
hydropower is not strictly accountable against sums Bonneville
owes the Treasury for the dams' construction. The theory was first
raised by a law student, and later adapted by Bonneville. See
Stephen Brown, Breathing Life into a Drowned Resource: Mitigating
Wildlife Losses in the Columbia Basin under the Northwest Power Act, 18
ENVTL. L. 597 (1988); Memorandum from Harvard Spigal, General
Counsel, to Randy Hardy, Administrator and Chief Executive
Officer, Bonneville Power Administration (June 6, 1994) (regard-
ing Interpretation of Section 4(h)(10)(C) of the Northwest Power
Act); Rivlin Letter, supra note 86.
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the agreement is premised on visions of salmon
recovery and the shape of the power system that
may or may not be outdated.
The vision of salmon recovery that underlies
the agreement is the vision that was in place before
Return to the River. Return implies big-ticket changes
for the dams, and urges an ecosystem approach
whose outlines are as yet unclear. While no one has
yet decided what the dam alterations should be, it
is hard to be confident that the Bonneville fund can
finance these alterations and also play a significant
role in restoring other parts of the ecosystem.
Another premise for the budget agreement was
the assumption that Bonneville and the hydropow-
er system would survive the transition to a compe-
tition in a more or less recognizable form. It is pos-
sible that they will. In 1996, a broad-based regional
process called the "Comprehensive Review of the
Region's Energy System" came together on a pro-
posal that by and large protect a cost-based energy
system for the region.88 The proposal also makes
provision for energy conservation, renewable ener-
gy, low-income protection and fish and wildlife re-
storation. But there are many questions about the
proposal. Fish and wildlife advocates are likely to
insist on a variety of assurances that fish and wild-
life are adequately provided for, assurances they
don't see in the report. And at bottom, the report
does not attempt to resolve the central issue in the
fish-power debate: to what extent will the hydro-
power projects be configured and operated to pro-
tect fish and wildlife and to what extent will the sys-
tem be dedicated to power production. While no
one expected the Comprehensive Review to resolve
this issue, it is bound to be a large part of the sub-
text in the debate that the proposal is expected to
provoke.
Equally important, no one can predict what
reception the proposal might meet within Congress.
As one of the members of the Review's steering
committee described it:
It appears certain that there will be nation-
al energy industry restructuring legislation
in the next Congress, perhaps in the next
year. The steering committee has been told
88. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NORTHWEST ENERGY SYSTEM,
TOWARD A COMPETITIvE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 12, 1996).
89. Richard Applegate, Much to Change. Much Remains the
Same, Address Before the Northwest Water Law and Policy
Project's Conference (Nov. 15, 1996).
90. Energy & Water Development Appropriations Act. 1996
Pub. L. No. 104-46, § 508(c)(1), 109 Stat 402, 420 (1995).
by members of Congress and the Clinton
Administration that the region has a
chance to write the Northwest chapter of
that legislation-but only if there is a clear
consensus in the region. If there is not, we
have been warned that forces outside the
region will have a field day. They will figure
out that there are billions of dollars of
long-term benefits in the Columbia River
hydrosystem and they will take those ben-
efits. It is certain that the electricity indus-
try will be restructured and the stakes are
very high for this region.8 9
This debate is also wrapped up with issues of river
governance. The governance question was explicitly
raised in a November, 1995 directive from Congress,
which emerged from the same legislative initiative
that was mooted by the Memorandum of
Agreement on Bonneville fish and wildlife funding.
An energy and water appropriations bill directed
the Power Planning Council to report to Congress
within 180 days "regarding the most appropriate
governance structure to allow more effective region-
al control over efforts to conserve and enhance
anadromous and resident fish and wildlife within
the Federal Columbia River Power System."90 The
immediate impetus for the legislation was concern
that the Endangered Species Act process was
eclipsing regional influence in the river, but the
fragmentation of fish and wildlife policy had been a
concern for many years.9'
In the process of developing its governance
report, the Council heard several proposals for
long-term institutional change, but none of these
proposals were strongly advocated. Indeed, there
was a general sense expressed by industry groups,
environmentalists and utilities that changes in the
Northwest Power Act and the Endangered Species
Act were undesirable. Because this conclusion was
not clearly explained, the Council tried to sharpen
the discussion by laying out several options.
Under one option, Congress would require all
federal agencies to act consistently with the
Council's fish and wildlife program. This would be a
way to ensure that federal agencies are making the
91. See Charles E Wilkinson & Daniel K. Conner, The Law of
the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary
Common Property Resource, 32 KAN. L. REv. 17, 104 (1983) ("Congress
and the courts, in their determined efforts to extend a measure of
protection to a threatened resource and to allocate its harvest
more fairly, have unwittingly multiplied management authority to
the point where the very institutions designed to protect the
resource have now, by virtue of their numbers and their unwield-
iness, become an additional threat.").
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most of the region's program, but stop short of a
mandatory program. If this change were augmented
with meaningful dispute resolution mechanisms
and direction to all the federal agencies to partici-
pate in an integrated budget process, these would
be significant changes.
Under a second option, Congress would create
a federal-state-tribal resource council, and give it
responsibility to implement the Northwest Power
Act, the Endangered Species Act and the Clean
Water Act insofar as the Columbia River and
Columbia River species are concerned. This would
require a major realignment of the region's fish and
wildlife institutions, and a re-write of several feder-
al laws.
As broad as these changes would be, Congress
could go further. Senator Hatfield periodically
reminds the region that the Columbia is a river, not
just a collection of water uses. Congress could cre-
ate a single authority to make all decisions about
the Columbia River and its watershed. The Council
convened a two-day workshop in February, 1996 to
brainstorm these options and search for others. The
process was productive, but did not lead to any
clear consensus for legislative change.
The hesitation to pursue legislation may have
stemmed in part from a realization of how funda-
mental these issues are. Are we dealing only with a
salmon problem? If so, we are talking about a broad
geographical range, including a large swath of the
ocean. Are we more interested in integrating river
management to meet multiple needs, not just those
of salmon? Are we talking about management of the
entire Columbia River watershed -all the land and
water uses that determine the watershed's health-
under some model of ecosystem management?
What weight should be assigned to the interests of
shrinking wild populations, Indian treaty obliga-
tions, economic values and community interests?
In its final report to Congress in May, 1996, the
Council did not resolve all these questions, but rec-
ommended incremental steps to encourage consis-
tency in fish and wildlife policy.9 2 In general, the
Council called for better collaboration rather than
sweeping changes in authority. However, the
Council also said that if collaboration fails, legisla-
tion should require federal agencies to act consis-
tently with the Council's program.
The Council's 1996 report proved to be just a
temporary lull in the governance debate. The issue
quickly arose in the Comprehensive Energy Review.
Just as the choice of a salmon recovery strategy can
92. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, REPORT TO
CONGRESS: FISH AND WILDLIFE GOVERNANCE AND THE COLUMBIA RIVER
HYDROPOWER SYSTEM (1996).
have economic implications for the energy industry,
the terms under which the hydropower system is
allocated and managed can determine the hydro-
power system's contribution to species recovery.
The Review considered itself ill constituted to
address issues that are so centrally concerned with
fish and wildlife. Accordingly, its final report urges
the region's governors to establish a process to find
a more definitive resolution for the governance
issue:
[Wle cannot expect to achieve both the
degree of cost stability the electricity
industry requires to maintain the benefits
of the Columbia River Power System for the
region and achieve sustainable fish
restoration unless we ensure predictability,
accountability and effective governance for
the fish and wildlife interests of the river. In
short, an effective conclusion of our effort
is not possible without an improved sys-
tem of river governance that pursues fish
restoration as a high priority.9 3
With this statement, the Northwest stands perched
at the edge of a new set of challenges: an emerging
vision of ecosystem science that poses large but
ambiguous challenges to current approaches to
river and salmon management; a growing commit-
ment to science-based species recovery; unprece-
dented instability in an energy system that is based
on the Columbia River; and growing restiveness
with the way the river is governed. This is the neigh-
borhood in which ecosystem salmon recovery must
look for a home.
V. Conclusion
It is a time of unusual peril for Columbia River
salmon, but peril sometimes borders on opportuni-
ty. The implications of ecosystem recovery and bio-
diversity protection in the Columbia River may be
clearer in a scientific sense than they ever have
been. The scientific community has made progress
in describing the ecosystem salmon need-an
ecosystem with intact natural functions and that
supports diverse species. We have as powerful a set
of tools for dealing with these problem as there is
anywhere on the planet: the Endangered Species
Act, the Northwest Power Act, and Indian and inter-
national treaties. Whatever the shortcomings of
these laws, they represent an impressive arsenal.
93. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE NORTHWEST ENERGY SYSTEM,
TOWARD A COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
4 (1994) (draft report).
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There is broad support for salmon recovery in many
parts of the Northwest. In their precarious condi-
tion, wild salmon are likely to maintain their visibil-
ity as an important regional and national icon.
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that a col-
lection of laws and broad public sympathy are
enough to restore wild salmon. What has happened
in the Columbia has not happened for lack of law or
sympathy, or because people are trying to eradicate
salmon. It has been an effect of the ways in which
we lead our lives-the way we generate power, grow
crops, ship grain and harvest timber. As Richard
White put it in The Organic Machine:
The architects of the new river have been
nearly constant in their protestations of
concern for salmon, but they have quite
consciously made a choice against the con-
ditions that produce salmon. They have
wanted the river and its watershed to say
electricity, lumber, cattle, and fruit and
together these have translated into carp,
shad, and squawfish instead of salmon.94
The Northwest will need an almost unimagin-
ably broad consensus to make ecosystem recovery
work, and it will require much more than laws and
bureaucracies. The Endangered Species Act, the
Northwest Power Act, the Columbia River Indian
treaties and other laws will have to work together to
shore up each other's inadequacies, and do so with
a careful appreciation of scientific data and meth-
ods. The issues at play in the Comprehensive
Energy Review and Congressional, the administra-
tive processes that influence the Bonneville Power
Administration's fish and wildlife budget, and the
activities of federal, state and tribal land and water
management agencies have the potential to con-
tribute to or defeat solutions. And a significant
number of the Northwest's people and economic
enterprises must change the way they do things.
No one can be sanguine about the outcome of
such an undertaking. It is probably true that few
Northwesterners wish to write a new entry for the
Microsoft Encarta telling of the Columbia River
salmon's ultimate slide to extinction. But this still
leaves two possibilities. One is that Microsoft will
leave the current entry unchanged and the Pacific
coast will be rife with salmon canneries only in
Encarta's virtual world. The other possibility is that
the people of the Northwest will find ways to trans-
late their feeling for salmon into rivers and commu-
nities that are not just part of an economy, but part
of an ecosystem. If this occurs, the Endangered
Species Act probably will have been an important
contributing factor. But not as important as the
region's will to protect salmon, rivers and diverse
species.
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